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Since spring 2006, Russian military commanders, and, subsequently, political leaders, 
consistently have attacked America’s plans to station missile defenses in Poland and 
the Czech Republic and argued against the possible emplacement of such defenses in 
Ukraine and Georgia. (1)  These programs appear to be leading to the revival of the 
idea that the US and NATO are the main threats to Russian security, a familiar, and 
perhaps congenial, position for the armed forces. (2)  In this vein, in April President 
Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s observance of the Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty (CFE) because of these planned defenses. (3)  Last month, Putin 
announced his decision to withdraw Russia from the CFE completely. Obviously, the 
missile defense plans bring together two things Moscow greatly opposes: NATO 
enlargement and the movement of American military power into the former Warsaw Pact 
area.   Although Russian officials clearly view these systems in the wider context of 
NATO enlargement, they have focused attention on the missile defense plans with an 
ever-louder campaign against them.  While a forceful attack on these plans was part of 
Putin’s February 2007 speech to the annual Munich Wehrkunde conference, the 
campaign has gathered momentum since then. (4)  But, clearly, it has not shaken 
America’s resolve to move forward with its defense policy. 
            
In their campaign against deployment of the missile defenses, Russian officials have 
offered several different charges concerning the motives, consequences, and negative 
implications of US actions.   This relentless rhetoric resembles nothing so much as 
earlier Soviet efforts against NATO’s actions to ensure European security against 
perceived Soviet threats.  And like those campaigns, a prime Russian objective 
apparently is to divide NATO members against one another and against America. (5)  
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Unfortunately, this campaign not only resembles its Soviet predecessors in goals, tone, 
and volume but in truthfulness, as well.  Russia’s current arguments against this 
planned deployment are for the most part groundless, even mendacious. 
            
For example, Moscow consistently charges that these defenses are being introduced 
without Russia having been consulted.  In fact, it has received at least ten detailed 
technical briefings about missile defenses, including a full briefing at the NATO-Russia 
Council. (6)  Thus, this demand for consultations reflects Russia’s abiding demand for a 
veto over US and NATO defense policies.  Similarly, Russia’s claim that European 
states have not been consulted and that this program exemplifies an American 
unilateralism that is driving Europe closer to war against its own interests is equally 
false, as the negotiations between America and its European allies show. (7)  Moreover, 
Russia portrays itself as Europe’s defender, a claim that is nothing short of ridiculous, 
given that one of the cornerstones of Russian foreign policy is to forestall, by whatever 
means possible, the completion of European integration. (8)  Thus, these charges about 
America’s unilateralism, rush to military action, and disregard for European interests, 
while insisting that Russia itself has Europe’s welfare at heart, merely repeat earlier 
efforts at denying the legitimacy of America’s interests in—and protection—of Europe, 
while seeking to divide Europe and America.  Neither has Russia’s military and political 
leadership helped by repeatedly threatening to target Poland and the Czech Republic 
with its missiles. (9)  If anything, such postures justify Prague and Warsaw’s support for 
these defenses.   As Franklin Roosevelt once noted about his rivals, one does not 
mention rope in the house of someone who has been hanged. 
            
President Putin and his supporters frequently have said that there is no threat that 
justifies these anti-missile defenses.  For example, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
complains “we are being called upon to fight a hypothetical threat (i.e., intermediate 
range missiles from Iran that could hit Europe) while a real threat to our security is 
looming.” (10)  Iran, they claim, has no capability to launch IRBMs (Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missiles) against Europe anytime soon.  This charge is again wholly 
mendacious.  Chief of Staff General Yuri Baluevsky already stated in 2002 that Iran 
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actually had nuclear weapons, even if he doubted it would attack America.  Meanwhile 
Iran’s missile program, based on European assessments, clearly encompasses a threat 
to Europe. (11)  A Slovak assessment in 2006 observed that, “The development of 
carriers of warheads is currently centered on the improvement of rockets of the class 
Shahab, Shahab-1, with flying range up to 330Km; and Shahab-2 with flying range up to 
700Km—still in the category of short-range ballistic missiles.  Shahab-3A and 3B with 
flying ranges up to 15000 and 2000 Km are intermediate range missiles.  Development 
focuses on missiles of the Ghador-110 type with flying range of about 3000Km.” (12)
Such Iranian missiles easily would have the capacity to target much of the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, and Russia, as well as, eventually, Europe.   Furthermore, in remarks 
made in February 2006, and subsequently, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov publicly 
observed that Russia’s neighbors (Iran, China, Pakistan) have IRBMs and only Russia 
and America do not possess these missiles. (13)  Therefore, Ivanov and his 
subordinates at the Ministry publicly have floated the idea of leaving the treaty on 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and building IRBMS, in spite of all the readily 
apparent dangers and disadvantages that such a course would bring to Russia. (14)  
Russia’s private statements to American officials in the Pentagon mirror its public 
complaints that all of its neighbors are arming themselves with such weapons and show 
conclusively that Moscow recognizes all too well the nature of the Iranian and Chinese 
threats. (15)  Russian private reactions to the American plan apparently are much more 
positive then are public responses, suggesting divided counsels in Moscow or “a good 
cop – bad cop” strategy. (16)  Conceivably, the existence of such divisions is what has 
led Putin, Ivanov, et. al. to adopt so uncompromising a tone in public, in the hope of 
stifling domestic debate and forcing American and European concessions.
Nevertheless, abundant ironies exist in Russia’s position.  First, it is a sad commentary 
on Moscow’s foreign policy that the only powers that can threaten it with missiles, and 
which are regarded as potential threats, are Russia’s so-called friends, Iran and China.  
Second and even worse, Russian technology and assistance has been instrumental in 
enhancing both countries’ conventional and missile capabilities.  Meanwhile, Russia has 
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long been engaged with China’s military in talks and cooperation on missile defenses 
and space activities and has materially assisted Iran’s space program. (17)  At the same 
time, withdrawal from the INF treaty, another Russian threat, would allow everyone, 
including these neighbors and America, to produce IRBMs again.  Certainly, NATO 
could then station IRBMs in the Baltic region and Poland.  However, Russia’s capability 
for producing IRBMs is strained and could only come at the expense of producing 
ICBMs, the cornerstone of its military deterrent capability.  Thus, withdrawal from the 
INF will not give Russia more security, but will achieve quite the opposite. (18)  Indeed, 
withdrawal from the INF treaty makes no sense unless one believes that Russia is 
genuinely—and more importantly—imminently threatened by NATO and cannot meet or 
deter that threat except by returning to the classic Cold War strategy of holding Europe 
hostage to nuclear attack, so as to deter Washington and NATO.  Of course, that would 
prompt everyone to build IRBMs as fast as possible for deterrence. Thus the argument 
that there is no IRBM threat is self-evidently non-credible. 
The concurrent charge that these missile defenses represent a real threat only to 
Russia’s deterrent or military capabilities also is a non-starter.  Alexei Arbatov already 
has demolished that argument in public; the many briefings given by the US to Moscow 
clearly reflect that fact, as Russian scientists and military-political figures well know. (19)  
Indeed, in typical Soviet style, the charges regarding American threats simultaneously 
are mixed with ominous statements by generals and other figures that if these missile 
defenses are installed, Moscow will have to take “adequate” measures, among them 
targeting those defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. (20)  Indeed, one almost 
wishes that they would do so, for it is precisely Russia’s irresponsibility in regard to arms 
sales and missile proliferation that has helped to create this threat.   “Adequate” 
measures against Iranian, North Korean, Pakistani, and Chinese proliferation are 
definitely to be encouraged. 
To compound the ridiculous nature of these charges, Putin, Ivanov, and several Russian 
generals also have made innumerable statements that these missile defenses actually 
pose no threat because Russia already has missiles that could penetrate any missile 
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defense. (21)  If this be true, then what is the problem?  And if it is not true why are they 
lying? After all, a November 17, 2006 article in RIA Novosti, citing Col. General Vladimir 
Zaritsky, commander of the missile forces and artillery, revealed that two-thirds of 
Russia’s missiles were obsolete.  Nonetheless, its rearmament plans through 2015 do 
not betray any undue alarm about these deployments. (22)  So, in fact, there is no 
urgent threat from America or NATO.
Finally, these military leaders also postulate that these proposed deployments could 
serve as the basis of the development of a whole series of interceptors, air-launched 
weapons, including missiles, and a defense infrastructure that could threaten Russia 
and its military capabilities. If Russia already can penetrate or spoof missile defenses, it 
probably can figure out how to counter those other capabilities and is certainly not 
devoid of its own robust and growing military capabilities, including ICBMs, which could 
deter Washington.  Admittedly, Washington and NATO are planning for an integrated 
missile shield to defend all of Europe against what both sides know to be real and 
potential threats in the future.  Yet, if there is a potential threat, then why has Russia 
hitherto spurned American offers of joint collaboration on missile defense? (23)  Beyond 
these questions, this kind of reasoning shows that Russia’s armed forces and 
government still think in terms of worst-case scenarios.  The military’s demand for 
expensive weapons systems is predicated on the basis that there is an ontological 
Western or American enemy, a posture that wholly contradicts the logic proclaimed by 
both Moscow and Washington in the Moscow treaty of 2002 on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions of nuclear weapons (SORT treaty).
The perception that these planned defenses actually form the basis for a future threat 
reflects more than a strategy of worst-case scenario building for the purpose of securing 
more funds and weapons for an army.  It shows also that Russia’s government and 
military are postulating an inherent East-West enmity that is only partially and 
incompletely buttressed by mutual deterrence.  Worse yet, mutual deterrence arguably 
makes no sense in today’s strategic climate, especially when virtually every Russian 
military leader proclaims, as did Baluevsky, that no plan for war with NATO is under 
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consideration and, further, that the main threat to Russia is terrorism, not NATO or 
America. (24)  Evidently, the army still needs to postulate an external NATO or American 
enemy, even though it can hardly perform its domestic mission and is corroded by rising 
corruption and such phenomena as dedovshchina (hazing), and pervasive brutality 
towards its soldiers. (25)  Thus it would appear, as it does to Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates, that the real threat is the rise of neighboring states’ short and medium-
range missile capabilities, i.e. Iran and China. (26)  But, Russia dare not admit that 
publicly.
What, then, lies behind this campaign?  While it is difficult to assign priorities to Russia’s 
goals as Russia sees them, it is clear that this campaign, like a Swiss army knife, cuts in 
many directions at once.  For the military, it is another opportunity to demand more 
money against what it has always perceived as an existential and now growing threat.  
For example, in addition to Ivanov, General Vladimir Vasilenko also raised the issue of 
withdrawal from the INF treaty in 2005, though it is difficult to see what Russia would 
gain from this move. (27)  Vasilenko stated that the nature and composition of any 
future US/NATO missile defense would determine the nature and number of future 
Russian missile forces and systems, even though, admittedly, any such missile defense 
systems could only defend against a few missiles at a time.  Thus, he said that, “Russia 
should give priority to high-survivable mobile ground and naval missile systems when 
planning the development of the force in the near and far future….The quality of the 
strategic nuclear forces of Russia will have to be significantly improved in terms of 
adding to their capability of penetrating [missile defense] barriers and increasing the 
survivability of combat elements and enhancing the properties of surveillance and 
control systems.” (28)
This is clearly a call for more investment in nuclear forces beyond what the government 
already has allocated in its rebuilding program through 2015. The program outlined 
below, according to Ivanov, will allow Russia to replace 45% of its existing arsenals with 
modern weapons by 2015. By that date, the program intends to build: 50 new Topol-M 
ICBM missile complexes on mobile launchers, 34 new silo-based Topol-M missiles and 
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control units, 50 new bombers, 31 ships, and fully rearm 40 tank, 97 infantry, and 50 
parachute battalions.  Forty Topol-M silo-based missiles already have been deployed.  
In 2007 alone the military would get seventeen new ballistic missiles, rather than four a 
year as has recently been the case, four spacecraft and booster rockets, overhaul a 
long-range aviation squadron, six helicopter and combat aviation squadrons, seven tank 
and thirteen motor rifle battalions.  Eleven billion dollars will be spent in 2007 alone on 
new weapons. Thirty-one new ships will be commissioned, including eight SSBNs 
carrying ICBMs (presumably the forthcoming Bulava missile).  And in 2009-2010, 
Russia will decide whether or not to build a new shipyard for the construction of aircraft 
carriers.  Fifty Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95 Bear Strategic Bombers would operate over 
this period as well.  Doctrinally, Russia also will retain its right to launch preemptive 
strikes. (29)  This program hardly squares with the demands being voiced by Vasilenko, 
et. al.
For political figures this campaign offers an opportunity to pit Russia against America 
and to foster divisions within the West.  But, they also see a threat here, i.e. NATO and 
the US military’s growing entrenchment in Eastern Europe, as well as NATO 
membership aspirations in the CIS, specifically in Ukraine and Georgia.  That trend is 
anathema to Moscow, which sees it as presaging the realization of all its nightmares: a 
unified democratic Europe backed by Washington, permanent strategic inferiority, an 
end to the neo-imperial fantasies that drive Russia’s foreign policy, and overwhelming 
external pressure for reform.  Since empire and autocracy are conjoined in Putin’s 
Russia as they were for his Soviet and Tsarist predecessors, the end of one, as in the 
past, logically entails the end of the other.  Since the elite can conceive of no 
justification for its power and rent-seeking other than the invocation of Russia as a great 
power, i.e. an empire that acts independently and autocratically at home and abroad 
(a.k.a. a “sovereign democracy”) any threat to the imperial mystique entails a threat to 
autocracy.  And the enlargement of the sphere of European democracy entails threats to 
empire, autocracy, and Russia’s cherished unilateralism.  Nonetheless, it still demands 
“total equality, including equality in the analysis of threats, in finding solutions, and 
making decisions.” (30)
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Perhaps Russia also perceives the proposed missile defenses as another example of 
American disregard for its interests and prestige.  But, Moscow certainly has no answer 
to the threat posed by Iranian or other proliferation.  Indeed, it is offering Middle Eastern 
states nuclear power, hardly the most responsible action. (31)  At the same time, the 
temptation to attempt to estrange America from Europe, both of whom Moscow regards 
as declining powers, obviously appeals to many in the political elite for whom such a 
policy remains almost a reflex.  However, these quarrels advance neither Russia’s nor 
anyone else’s security.  Indeed, Secretary of State Rice stated that the notion that these 
defenses threaten Russia is “ludicrous.” (32)  If Washington and Moscow are both 
strategic partners, as the SORT Treaty implies, then it is high time that they move 
forward together on a broad arms control agenda, to meet common threats and get 
beyond the structures of mutual deterrence, in which their nuclear forces are currently 
deployed. 
Apart from the missile defense issue, there are many points on the arms control agenda 
where Russia has more legitimate interests and points of view and where America 
would be well advised to discuss them seriously, e.g. Moscow’s proposals for a 
START-3 treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty).  Here, Moscow has called 
repeatedly for negotiating a new treaty to replace the START-1 Treaty that expires in 
2009, but the US Administration has rebuffed its calls until now, claiming it prefers not to 
have each side’s nuclear arsenals define their relationship.  In other words, the US still 
chases the mirage of unencumbered nuclear and strategic unilateralism. (33)  Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on the other hand, has outlined an entirely contrary 
approach for Russia – but one admittedly possessing much realism. “Our main criterion 
is ensuring the Russian Federation’s security and maintaining strategic stability as much 
as possible….We have started such consultations already.  I am convinced that we 
need a substantive discussion on how those lethal weapons could be curbed on the 
basis of mutual trust and balance of forces and interests.  We will insist particularly on 
this approach.  We do not need just the talk that we are no longer enemies and 
therefore we should not have restrictions for each other.  This is not the right approach.  
8
It is fraught with an arms race, in fact, because, it is very unlikely that either of us will be 
ready to lag behind a lot.” (34)
Here, Lavrov puts his finger on the fact that in an atmosphere of political mistrust, where 
both sides’ deployments are still based on deterrence and mutually assured destruction, 
strategic unilateralism is both unacceptable and, indeed, dangerous because it 
stimulates arms races across the world.  This argument cuts both ways, e.g. Russian 
withdrawal from the INF Treaty would lead both NATO and China to build more such 
missiles aimed at Russia, as Alexei Arbatov has observed. (35)  Similarly, withdrawal 
from the CFE treaty opens up the prospect of both a conventional and nuclear arms 
race in Europe, a race that Russia cannot win and that can lead only to further 
disasters.  At the same time, however, Washington’s quest for ever more credible 
options for deterrence, dissuasion, and even nuclear warfighting scenarios, only 
stimulates other countries’ insecurities and desire to achieve their own means of 
deterring or dissuading America. (36)  Simultaneously, strategic stability and bilateralism 
also would reverse the trend toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons as warfighting 
instruments that has been in effect at least since 2000, with the added benefit of 
possibly reducing the attractiveness of such weapons to would-be proliferators. (37)
The foregoing analysis thus shows that proliferation is another issue that requires 
cooperation, not spite, which, as Lenin observed at the end of his life, plays the very 
worst role in politics.  These are the real issues that urgently require great power 
cooperation.  Missile defense, however, is not one of them and Moscow’s exploitation of 
this issue is unworthy of a state claiming to be a great power.
~~~
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